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Abstract
The recent surge of blockchain systems has renewed the interest in traditional Byzantine
fault-tolerant consensus protocols. Many such consensus protocols have a primary-backup
design in which an assigned replica, the primary, is responsible for coordinating the con-
sensus protocol. Although the primary-backup design leads to relatively simple and high-
performance consensus protocols, it places an unreasonable burden on a good primary and
allows malicious primaries to substantially affect the system performance.
In this paper, we propose a protocol-agnostic approach to improve the design of primary-
backup consensus protocols. At the core of our approach is a novel wait-free approach of
running several instances of the underlying consensus protocol in parallel. To yield a high-
performance parallelized design, we present coordination-free techniques to order operations
across parallel instances, deal with instance failures, and assign clients to specific instances.
Consequently, the design we present is able to reduce the load on individual instances and
primaries, while also reducing the adverse effects of any malicious replicas.
1 Introduction
The introduction of Bitcoin—the first wide-spread application driven by blockchains—has re-
sulted in a surge of interest in blockchain technology. This interest is backed by many use
cases in the public and private sectors. For example, in trade [10, 13, 34, 36, 36], identity
management [3, 10, 34], food production [18], aid delivery [3, 34], health care [7, 19, 25], fraud
prevention [24], and GDPR compliance [15]. At the core of these use cases is the need to manage
and replicate data, such as financial transactions, among a group of participants. Consequently,
at the core of blockchain technology are consensus protocols that allow replicating data across
a group of servers (replicas), some of which can fail or can act maliciously.
Several use cases for blockchains operate in a permissioned environment in which the par-
ticipants can only join via well-established procedures. These established procedures prevent
malicious entities from controlling a majority of the replicas. In this permissioned environment,
a blockchain can be maintained using traditional high-performance Byzantine fault-tolerant
(bft) consensus protocols [4, 5, 11, 12, 14, 20, 23, 26–28, 32, 33, 37, 44]. Commonly, these
protocols use the primary-backup model pioneered in the Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerant
consensus protocol [11]. In these bft protocols, a single replica is designated as the primary
and is responsible for coordinating the consensus decisions, while all the other replicas perform
the backup role.
The primary-backup model simplifies the development of consensus protocols substantially:
when a primary is non-malicious, then even the simplest broadcast replication protocols suffice.
∗A brief announcement of this work will be presented at the 33rd International Symposium on Distributed
Computing (DISC 2019) [21].
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The only complication in these consensus protocols is the way in which they deal with malicious
primaries: malicious behavior must be either detected (after which the primary can be replaced)
or prevented altogether. This simplicity of the primary-backup model negatively affects its
performance in three ways [2, 5, 14, 41]:
1. Primary load. The primary not only has to perform the primary tasks, but also the
backup role (as it is itself a replica). Consequently, the primary receives a higher load than
other replicas, and this load at the primary can become a bottleneck in the overall system
throughput. This is especially the case in fine-tuned high-performance consensus protocols that
employ complex cryptographic primitive, for example, to reduce communication overheads or to
improve resilience.
2. Primary replacement. As stated earlier, primary-backup consensus protocols work only
when the primary behaves in accordance with the protocol. If the primary acts malicious or
is faulty, then it will be replaced. However, detection of such behaviors requires setting timers.
Further, replacing a faulty primary usually takes a while. During this time the system is unable
to handle requests, which negatively affects its overall throughput.
3. Malicious behavior. Primary-backup consensus protocols rely on the underlying algorithm
to detect malicious behavior of the primary. Usually, these detectors are only capable of detecting
catastrophic failures that prevent new consensus decisions altogether, but they fail to detect or
deal with primaries that affect the performance of the system in other ways, for example, a
malicious primary could reduce or throttle the throughput of the system.
To the best of our knowledge, no approach is yet able to address all these limitations of
primary-backup consensus protocols. In this work, we address these limitations in a protocol-
agnostic manner by exploiting parallelization. In our paradigm, we run several instances of the
underlying consensus protocol in parallel and we balance the system load among these parallel
instances. This parallelism helps to reduce the load per primary and mitigates the negative
impacts of a single primary on the throughput of the system. Our design is fine-tuned such
that the instances coordinated by non-faulty replicas are wait-free: they can continuously make
consensus decisions, independent of the behavior of any other instances. Our paradigm is highly
flexible: it can be used in combination with any well-behaved primary-backup consensus protocol
and it can be fine-tuned towards various application-specific needs.
Organization. In Section 2, we introduce terminology and notations that we use throughout
this paper. In Section 3, we present how we envision parallelization of consensus protocols, and
tackle the main design challenges. Next, in Section 4, we refine the heavily step-wise coordi-
nated approach of Section 3 by presenting a wait-free design that adds additional challenges but
supports maintaining high throughput. Finally, in Section 5, we discuss related work and in
Section 6 we conclude on our findings and discuss avenues for further research.
2 Preliminaries
In this work, we present a protocol-agnostic paradigm to parallelize consensus protocols with
the aim of increasing consensus throughput, while reducing the effects of individual malicious
replicas. We now introduce the notations and assumptions used throughout this paper.
Service notation. We represent a replicated service by a triple S = (C,R,F), where C is the
set of clients using the service, R is the set of replicas and F ⊂ R is the set of faulty replicas
that exhibit Byzantine behavior. We write n = |R| and f = |F| to denote the number of replicas
and faulty replicas, respectively. We assign each replica R ∈ R a unique identifier id(R) with
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0 ≤ id(R) < n. Similarly, we assign each client c ∈ C a unique identifier id(c) with 0 ≤ id(c) < |C|.
The set of non-faulty replicas, denoted by nf(S), is defined as nf(S) = R\F. We assume that the
non-faulty replicas behave in accordance with the protocol and are deterministic: on identical
inputs, we expect non-faulty replicas to produce identical outputs.
Consensus protocol. A consensus protocol helps to replicate a sequence of values among all
the non-faulty replicas. A single execution of a correct consensus protocol satisfies the following
two requirements [39]:
1. Termination. Each non-faulty replica accepts a value.
2. Non-divergence. All non-faulty replicas accept the same value.
In this paper, we consider those consensus protocols that replicate a sequence of client requests
(for example, database operations). In this setting, the termination and non-divergence require-
ments imply data consistency, a safety property. Additionally, termination of one round (or
one consensus) assures that all the non-faulty replicas have the same state. This ensures that
any preconditions for the next round are met, which implies availability, a liveness property.
Most general-purpose consensus protocols that do not expect synchronous communication to
guarantee non-divergence require n > 3f, which we also assume throughout this paper [11, 12].
The focus of this paper are the consensus protocols that follow the primary-backup model. In
such protocols, a single replica is assigned the role of the primary and is responsible for initiating
and coordinating each round of the consensus protocols, while all the remaining replicas perform
the backup role. As the primary can be malicious, these protocols usually have the means to
detect failure of the primary and transfer control to a new primary. A well-known example
of a primary-backup consensus protocol is the Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance protocol
(Pbft) [11, 12], which has inspired the design of many modern consensus protocols [4, 5, 14, 26–
28, 33].
Sequence and map notations. Let S = [s0, . . . , sk−1] be a sequence. We write S[i] to denote
si and |S| to denote the length k of S. If v is a value, then S ⊕ v = [s0, . . . , sk−1, v] denotes the
concatenation of S and v. If v is a value, then S \ v denotes the sequence obtained from S by
removing all occurrences of v. If k and v are values, then we write k 7→ v to denote a key-value
mapping that maps k onto v.
Cryptographic primitives. We assume a collision-resistant hash function that maps an ar-
bitrary value v to a numeric value Hash(v) in a bounded range, called the digest [29]. We assume
that it is practically impossible to find another value v′, v 6= v′, such that Hash(v) = Hash(v′).
3 Parallelizing consensus
We now present our paradigm to parallelize a consensus protocol. In our paradigm, each replica
R ∈ R participates in m, 1 ≤ m ≤ n, instances of the underlying consensus protocol. We
use I = {I1, . . . ,Im} to denote these instances, where 1, . . . ,m acts as the instance identifier.
We write Ii(R) to denote the i-th instance, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, running on a replica R and we use
I(R) = {I1(R), . . . ,Im(R)} to represent all the m instances running, in parallel, on the replica
R. Further, we represent the primary of an i-th instance as Pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Our paradigm
enforces that each primary exists on a distinct replicas, that is, for all 1 ≤ i < j ≤ m, we have
Pi 6= Pj.
Figure 1 presents a set of tasks undertaken by a replica employing our paradigm. Each
replica takes as input a bft protocol and runs m instance of that protocol in parallel. Once
these instances complete, the replica generates a global order of the requests across all these
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Run a round of m bft
instances to accept m client
requests in parallel.
Collect accepted requests
and create an order among
the requests.
Execute the requests in
the created order
Parallelized Consensus Ordering Execution
Figure 1: A basic flow of tasks undertaken by a replica while employing our paradigm. Each
replica is given the same bft protocol.
instances and executes these requests in the global order. For the sake of clarity, we first
present a parallelized design in which the instances operate in a coordinated step-wise manner.
Furthermore, we assume that each instance operates a general consensus protocol:
Definition 3.1. We model a consensus protocol as a black-box that operates in well-defined
rounds. In each such round, a single consensus decision is made by all the non-faulty replicas.
If a round succeeds, then S(CR) is the consensus decision observed by all the non-faulty replicas,
where CR is the client request accepted by all the non-faulty replicas in that round. If a round
fails, then F is the consensus decision observed by all the non-faulty replicas, which indicates a
primary failure. After a failure, a replica can be instructed to transfer control to a new primary.
If all the non-faulty replicas are instructed to transfer control to the same new primary, then
this process will succeed and a new primary is elected.1
The general model of Definition 3.1 allows us to focus on the core challenges in parallelizing
consensus protocols. At the core of our paradigm is the coordination of m instances of a consen-
sus protocol running in parallel. This implies that a single round of our paradigm coordinates
multiple parallel consensus rounds, each of which is initiated and managed by a distinct primary
Pi for the instance Ii, 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Each consensus decision succeeds whenever Pi is non-faulty.
This approach to parallelization raises several important challenges:
1. For optimal throughput, we need to ensure that each instance is making a distinct consen-
sus decision, that is, each instance is processing a distinct client request.
2. Every non-faulty replica should execute all the accepted client requests in the same order.
3. When several instances fail in a round and want to transfer control to new primaries, then
all non-faulty replicas need to do so in the same manner.
In our design, we address each of these challenges. Figure 2 sketches a high-level overview of a
parallelized consensus round at replica R.
In each parallelized consensus round, we first allow each of the m instances to independently
reach a consensus decision. Next, we collect these decisions. The success decisions—of the form
S(CR)—are executed in a deterministic fashion. The failure decisions—of the form F—are used
to recover the instances involved in these decisions. To recover these instances, we replace their
respective primaries, which we explain later in this section.
We use Dρ,i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, to denote the consensus decision of instance Ii, agreed by all the
non-faulty replicas in round ρ. Similarly, we use Pi,ρ to indicate the primary of the i-th instance
in round ρ. We write Dρ = {Dρ,1, . . . ,Dρ,m} to represent the set ofm consensus decisions agreed
upon by all the non-faulty replicas. Finally, we write
S(Dρ) = {i 7→ S(CR) | Dρ,i = S(CR), 1 ≤ i ≤m}; F(Dρ) = {i 7→ F | Dρ,i = F, 1 ≤ i ≤m},
1Several practical bft-style consensus protocols do not strictly adhere to these assumptions. To improve
throughput, these protocols provide partial consensus, in which a majority of the non-faulty replicas are guar-
anteed to make successful consensus decisions. In these partial consensus protocols, consensus among all the
non-faulty replicas is guaranteed only eventually through additional checkpoint and recovery steps.
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Figure 2: A high-level overview of a replica R. The replica coordinates a single consensus round
among m instances of some consensus protocol. Each instance yields a consensus decision. The
success decisions yield a set of client requests, which are executed in a deterministic order. The
failure decisions are collected and can be used to replace primaries in a unified manner.
to denote the partitioning of Dρ into sets of success decisions and failure decisions.
In Section 3.1, we describe how to determine the order of execution of the client requests in
S(Dρ) and in Section 3.2, we describe how to deal with primary failure in a coordinated manner
in response to the failure decisions in F(Dρ). We discuss the assignment of clients to instances
in the following section as part of the efforts to optimize parallelization benefits by removing the
need for round-based step-wise operations.
3.1 Deterministic round execution
The correctness of the underlying consensus protocol, used by instances I1, . . . ,Im, guarantees
that each non-faulty replica derives the same set of client requests S(Dρ) in round ρ. Hence,
non-faulty replicas only need to determine the order of execution of these client requests.
A simple solution would be to order the client requests based on their instance identifiers:
first execute the client request of I1 (if any), then execute the client request of I2 (if any), and
so on until all the requests are executed. Although this approach guarantees a unique sequential
order among all the executed client requests across all the non-faulty replicas, the approach also
gives earlier instances disproportional control over execution. We illustrate this next:
Example 3.2. Consider a financial service in which client requests are of the form
transfer(A,B, n,m) := if amount(A) > n then withdraw(A,m); deposit(B,m).
Let CR1 = transfer(Alice,Bob, 500, 200) and CR2 = transfer(Bob,Eve, 400, 300) be client requests.
Execution of CR1 influences the outcome of execution of CR2: if 200 ≤ amount(Bob) < 400, then
execution of CR1 before CR2 will result in a transfer of 300 to Eve. If CR1 is executed after CR2,
then Eve will not receive anything. Hence, by choosing a predictable order of execution, earlier
instances in the ordering can influence the execution of any requests accepted by later instances.
To resolve the illustrated shortcoming, we propose a method to deterministically select a
different permutation of the order of execution in every round. Note that for any sequence S
of k = |S| values, there exist k! distinct permutations. We write P (S) to denote the set of
permutations of S. As |P (S)| = k!, there exists a bijection fS : {0, . . . , k! − 1} → P (S). Next,
we define the function fS recursively. We have the following:
fS(i) =
{
S if |S| = 1;
fS\S[q](r)⊕ S[q] if |S| > 1,
in which q = idiv(|S| − 1)! is the quotient and r = imod(|S| − 1)! is the remainder of integer
division by (|S| − 1)!.
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Replica R ∈ nf(S)
1: event collected S(Dρ) in round ρ :
2: Let S := [CR | (i 7→ S(CR)) ∈ S(Dρ)], ordered on identifier i.
3: for CR ∈ fS(Hash(S)mod|S(Dρ)|!) with CR requested by c ∈ C :
4: Execute CR, yielding a resulting value v.
5: Send v to c.
Figure 3: The execution protocol
running at each non-faulty replica
of service S = (C,R,F).
Lemma 3.3. Function fS is a bijection from {0, . . . , |S|!− 1} to all possible permutations of S.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the size of S. The base case is |S| = 1, in which case
fS = {0 7→ S}, a bijection. As the induction hypothesis, we assume that fS′ is a bijection for all
S′ with |S′| ≤ j. Next, consider the case fS with |S| = j+1. Observe that, for each s ∈ S, there
exist j! permutations of S that end with s. The computation of q = idiv(|S|− 1)! = idiv j! and
r = imod(|S| − 1)! = imod j! divides all possible values i into (j + 1) ranges of j! values each.
Hence, each s ∈ S is chosen via j! different values of i, and we have j! different possible values
for r for each choice of s. The function fS chooses s = S[q]. By the induction hypothesis, the
function fS\s(r) is a bijection. Thus, we conclude that the function fS is also a bijection.
The result of fS(ρmod|S|!), on a sequence S of all the consensus decisions of round ρ, can be
used by all non-faulty replicas as a deterministic order of execution. This approach ensures that
each instance receives equal opportunity to propose the client request to be executed first, across
all the replicas. However, this approach is highly predictable. Hence, as a further improvement,
we can use the value h = Hash(R), with R the set of client requests accepted in round ρ, instead
of the round number ρ to determine the order of execution. Assuming at least one primary
is non-malicious (m > f), this value h is only known after completion of the round ρ as the
malicious primaries cannot effectively collude to obtain a certain order of execution. Figure 3
presents the pseudo-code for the execution protocol.
Proposition 3.4. The execution protocol of Figure 3 guarantees that every non-faulty replica
executes client request in the same order. If m > f, then malicious replicas cannot control the
order of execution. If n > 2f, then clients will always receive at least f+1 identical results (from
at least f+ 1 non-faulty replicas) and can reliably detect successful execution of their request.
3.2 Dealing with primary failure
The easiest way to deal with primary failure is by shutting down the instance coordinated by
that primary. This approach would work well for some time, as in most practical settings the set
of faulty replicas is relatively stable. However, for high availability, we need to consider a more
dynamic setting in which we only know that at most f replicas are faulty in a specific window
of time (as faulty replicas can recover and non-faulty replicas can become faulty). Hence, we
propose two targeted methods to deal with primary failure.
3.2.1 Discarding primaries and in-place recovery
An easy way to deal with faulty primaries is by permitting a certain delay for the failing instance
to recover, after which all the non-faulty replicas are instructed to transfer control back to the
previously-failed primary. This requires all the non-faulty replicas to agree on a delay and this
delay needs to provide the faulty primary sufficient time to recover. If the delay is too short, then
it would result in repeated primary failure, which in turn would lead to multiple failed attempts
to transfer control back to the primary, an unnecessary cost for all the replicas. To determine the
right delay, the replicas can start with a small value (in number of rounds) and double this value
after each failure. This approach does not necessitate any coordination between the replicas or
between the instances. Further, this approach even works when m > n− f, in which case some
primaries might always be faulty while no non-faulty replicas are available to replace them.
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Replica R ∈ nf(S)
1: failed := ∅.
2: primary := {(i 7→ Ri) | 0 ≤ i < m, id(Ri) = i}.
3: event collected F(Dρ) in round ρ :
4: failed := failed ∪ {Pi | (i 7→ F) ∈ F(Dρ)}.
5: for 1 ≤ i ≤ m with (i 7→ F) ∈ F(Dρ) :
6: Im := {primary [i] | 1 ≤ i ≤ m}.
7: Choose the replica P ∈ (R \ (failed ∪ Im)) with smallest id(P ).
8: primary [i] := P .
9: Inform instance Ii of its new primary P .
Figure 4: The unified primary re-
placement protocol running at each
non-faulty replica of service S =
(C,R,F).
3.2.2 Unified primary replacement
A second way to deal with faulty primaries is by replacement. Indeed, when m ≤ n − f our
paradigm can aim for a stable set of m non-faulty primaries by replacing a failed primary
by another available replica. This approach is akin to the one taken by traditional bft-style
consensus protocols. In such protocols, the failure of the primary P is detected whenever the
behavior of P prevents successful consensus decisions. After detecting the failure of P , all the
non-faulty replicas switch to the next primary. This next primary is deterministically selected
by choosing the replica following P , that is, by choosing the replica R with id(R) = id(P ) + 1.2
However, such a selection strategy may not work with our paradigm as we require all the m
instances to have distinct primaries.
Example 3.5. Consider instances I1 and I2 with primaries R = P1 and Q = P2 with id(R) = 1
and id(Q) = 2. Consider the following two consensus decisions made during round ρ:
1. Dρ = [F,S(CR)]. Here, instance I1 needs to replace its primary. If I1 chooses the replica
following R, replica Q, then both instances end up with the same primary.
2. Dρ = [F,F]. Here, both the instances need to replace their primaries. If I1 chooses the
replica following R, replica Q, then it will end up with a known faulty primary. If I1
realizes that Q was already in use by I2, then I1 would choose the replica following Q.
Unfortunately, in such a case, I2 would do the same and both instances would end up with
the same primary.
These cases illustrate that primary replacement would fail without coordination between the
instances. Hence, this coordination is an essential task in our parallelization paradigm.
We introduce a unified primary replacement protocol, which facilitates coordinated primary
replacement among the instances. The protocol requires each non-faulty replica to maintain an
internal state (failed , primary), where failed ⊆ F is the set of known faulty replicas, and primary :
{1, . . . ,m} → (R \ failed) is an injective function that maps each instance Ii, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, onto
its primary, that is, primary(i) = Pi. The function primary never maps to known faulty replicas.
Figure 4 presents the pseudo-code for this protocol. Formally, the unified primary replacement
protocol maintains the following invariants:
Invariant 3.6. Let S be a service. We write failedρ(R) and primaryρ(R) to denote the value
of these variables at non-faulty replica R ∈ nf(S) at the start of round ρ. Further, we use
primaryρ(R)[i], 1 ≤ i ≤ m, to denote the primary of instance Ii. For every R,Q ∈ nf(S), the
following properties hold at the start of every round ρ:
1. failedρ(R) = {Pi,j | (i 7→ F) ∈ F(Dj), 1 ≤ j < ρ};
2. primaryρ(R) is an injective function and primaryρ(R)[i] ∈ (R \ failed), 1 ≤ i ≤m;
2Recently, a few consensus protocols proposed choosing primaries uniformly at random using a distributed
random coin [1]. Such an approach replaces the malicious primaries with a non-faulty replica with high probability.
Our parallelization paradigm can easily be extended to use this approach.
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3. primaryρ(R) = primaryρ(Q) and failedρ(R) = failedρ(Q) ⊆ F.
Proposition 3.7. The unified primary replacement protocol of Figure 4 maintains Invariant 3.6.
Proof. Let S = (C,R,F) be a service and let R,Q ∈ nf(S). Initially, due to Line 2, we have
failed0(R) = failed0(Q) = ∅ and primary0(R)[i] = primary0(Q)[i] = Pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, in which
id(Pi) = i. Hence, Invariant 3.6 initially holds.
Next, we assume that Invariant 3.6 holds at the start of round ρ, and we prove that it
again holds at the start of round ρ + 1. At Line 4, the failed primaries in F(Dρ) are added
to failed . As the underlying consensus protocol ensures that every replica decides on the same
set F(Dρ), all the non-faulty replicas make identical changes to failed . Hence, we are assured
that Invariant 3.61 is maintained. The loop at Line 5 will replace every newly detected faulty
primary by a freshly chosen primary that is not yet in use (not in Im) and is not a known faulty
replica (not in failed). As all non-faulty replicas agree on F(Dρ), they process values in F(Dρ) in
the same order (Line 5). Further, each non-faulty replica choose new primaries deterministically
(Line 7) and makes the same changes to primary . Hence, we are assured that Invariants 3.62
and 3.63 are maintained. Finally, at Line 9 each instance Ii that decided F in round ρ gets
assigned a new primary primary[i]. Thus, we conclude that Invariant 3.6 holds.
For environments in which the set of faulty replicas is ever changing, the unified primary
replacement protocol can easily be tweaked such that faulty primaries are eventually reconsidered
(for example, by reintroducing the earliest failed replicas after all the other replicas have failed).
4 Optimizing parallelization to increase performance
In the previous section, we presented a paradigm for parallelizing consensus protocols. To
simplify the presentation, we presented a step-wise design whose practical implementation would
require substantial coordination between instances (for example, via the use of locks). In practice,
this step-wise design incurs a lot of waiting, which we illustrate next:
Example 4.1. Consider service S working on a consensus round ρ and let R ∈ nf(S) be a
non-faulty replica. We describe four cases in which the design presented in Section 3 induces
waiting:
1. The execution of client requests consumes time and forces all the instances to wait until
completion.
2. In a practical setting, there can be a variation in message delivery time, which can lead
to instances making consensus decisions at different speeds. For example, a temporary
hiccup in the network can cause the instance I1 to take twice the time it takes the other
instances to make a consensus decision in round ρ. Hence, all the other instances would
have to wait for I1 to complete with a successful consensus decision.
3. A faulty primary Pi coordinating instance Ii, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, can actively throttle the speed
at which its instance makes a consensus decision, which delays all the other instances.
4. A primary Pi coordinating instance Ii, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, can crash. Existing consensus pro-
tocols [11, 26] detect such a crash through large timeout values. This forces the other
instances, whose consensus throughput should only be limited by the network latency, to
wait for long idle periods for a primary failure to resolve.
Waiting reduces the attainable performance (given the available resources). Fortunately, all
the above described forms of waiting can be eliminated from our paradigm. First, in Section 4.1,
we describe how to eliminate waiting. This complicates dealing with client requests, and, hence,
in Section 4.2, we describe these complications and provide solutions to resolve them.
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4.1 Making parallelization wait-free
To ensure the correctness of our parallelization paradigm, we do not require any instance to wait
for the other instances. Consider a service working on consensus round ρ. First, we observe
that the execution of client requests in round ρ has no influence on the consensus decisions of
future rounds. Second, the instances arriving at successful consensus decisions do not require
any coordination. The only required coordination between the instances is the unified primary
replacement (Section 3.2.2), which is limited to instances with failed primaries. Hence, instances
that arrived at successful consensus decisions in the current round are free to make consensus
decisions for the future rounds, while the execution of the client requests of previous rounds
occurs in the background, and the other instances are still making consensus decisions for the
current round. Thus, dealing with Example 4.1, Case 1 and Case 2, is straightforward.
To arrive at a fully wait-free design, we must also address the malicious behaviors described
in Example 4.1, Case 3 and Case 4, and deal with any structural differences in speed of the
instances. Note that if these behaviors are left unhandled, then they can cause unbounded
delays between the acceptance and execution of a client request, which we illustrate next:
Example 4.2. Consider a service with m = 2 instances, where instance I1 makes a consensus
decision every 10µs and I2 makes a consensus decision every 20µs. As I2 operates slower, it
determines the speed by which the system can complete a consensus round. Consequently, over
time I1 will make consensus decisions of an ever growing set of client requests that are awaiting
execution. Further, the delay between I1 accepting a client request and its execution grows
without a bound.
Similarly, consider the case in which both instances make consensus decisions every 10µs.
Assume that in round ρ the primary P2 of instance I2 fails. Further, assume it takes 500µs to
detect such a failure and 100µs to replace the primary. In such a case, I1 would have made
60 consensus decisions before I2 resumes normal operation. Hence, after round ρ all the client
requests accepted by I1 will see an additional delay of 600µs.
The situations illustrated in Example 4.2 are among the several cases in which the client re-
quests accepted by well-performing instances would see their execution unnecessary delayed due
to interference (delays) from other instances. Next, we show how our parallelization paradigm
can address these cases using a simple yet effective principle:
Definition 4.3. We say that an instance Ii, 1 ≤ i ≤m, suffers a soft failure if it is working on
a consensus decision in round ρ, while some other instance is already working on a consensus
decision in round ρ+σ. We call σ the gap size, which is determined by the network latency and
the timeout used to detect failures.
When an instance Ii, 1 ≤ i ≤m, suffers any type of failure in round ρ, including soft failures,
then Ii is excluded from contributing to the next ε consensus rounds. We call ε the skip size,
which is determined by the gap size and time to replace the faulty primary. Hence, in case of
the failure of instance Ii in round ρ, Ii starts making consensus decisions for consensus round
ρ+ ε.
The soft failure principle is based on the assumption that all instances coordinated by the
non-faulty primaries should reach successful consensus decisions roughly within the same time
(as they all operate in the same environment). Hence, instances that lag by a significant margin
σ could be led by a faulty primary.3 Each replica locally detects the soft failure of its instance
Ii, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, and uses the fault detection infrastructure of the underlying consensus protocol
to work towards ending the ongoing consensus round with a decision F. The concept of soft
failures addresses the execution delays due to underperforming instances, whereas the skipping
of consensus rounds allows previously-failed instances to catch up with the other instances.
3A similar assumption is the basis of Rbft [5], see Section 5.
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Theorem 4.4. Instances are wait-free: instances can make successful consensus decisions with-
out outside interference and, at the same time, the delay between an instance accepting a client
request and the replicas executing this client request is upper-bounded.
Note that if unified primary replacement (Section 3.2.2) is used to deal with primary failures,
then natural fluctuations in the performance of an instance can cause an unjust replacement of its
primary. Hence, we allow treatment of soft failures as temporarily failures from which primaries
can eventually recover: a replica that fails soft can be considered non-faulty when the unified
primary replacement protocol runs out of replicas it considers non-faulty.
4.2 Consistent handling of client requests
Consensus protocols facilitate execution of client requests in a consistent manner across all the
non-faulty replicas. Usually, consensus protocols can also aim at executing these client requests
in the order they were sent by the clients. Maintaining this consistent ordering becomes harder
when parallelizing consensus protocols:
Example 4.5. Consider a service S with two instances I1 and I2 and client c. If both I1 and I2
are about to make a consensus decision for round ρ and c sends a request CR to both instances,
then both instances might propose the same request, which would waste resources. If c sends
requests CR1 to I1 and CR2 to I2, then the order in which these requests are executed is subject
to decisions made by the execution protocol (Section 3.1). Moreover, due to the wait-free design,
instances I1 and I2 can be in completely different rounds when proposing CR1 and CR2, again
making the order of execution independent of the order in which c requested CR1 and CR2.
If consistent ordering of execution of client requests is not necessary, e.g., if client requests
operate on conflict-free replicated data types [38], then clients can simply send their transactions
to arbitrary instances. If consistent ordering is necessary, then the straightforward way to
guarantee ordering is to assign each client to a unique instance.
Let S = (C,R,F) be a service. If we assume |C| >m, then we can assign clients to instances
in a round-robin manner by requiring that the instance Ii, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, only deals with client
requests of clients c ∈ C with i = id(c)modm. We notice that a client c can be assigned to
an instance with a faulty primary that might ignore the client request. In existing consensus
protocols, this behavior eventually leads to the primary being detected as faulty. Hence, based
on how we deal with the faulty primaries there are two ways to guarantee service for c.
1. If faulty primaries are replaced (Section 3.2.2), then unified primary replacement assures
that eventually a non-faulty primary will coordinate the instance and propose the requests
of c.
2. If faulty primaries are not replaced (Section 3.2.1), then the requests of client c could get
indefinitely ignored by a faulty primary that never recovers. In such a case, we allow c to
switch to another instance Ii, 1 ≤ i ≤ m. To do so, c sends an instance-change request
to Ii. If Ii gets this request, then it adds the change-request to reassign c to Ii to the
consensus decision it is going to make in ρ by proposing to all replicas to reassign the client
to Ii in round ρ+2σ. After this proposal is requested, instance Ii is able to propose client
requests for c after round ρ+ 2σ is executed. To assure balanced load among instances, a
non-faulty instance only has to accept an instance-change request if it does not yet have
⌈|C|/|nf(S)|⌉ clients assigned.
4.3 Overview of wait-free designs
We have explored several different designs for the parallelization of consensus protocols, each
resulting in a valid and highly parallelized consensus protocol. Next, we summarize our findings.
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Theorem 4.6. The parallelization paradigm we propose can turn a general consensus proto-
col into a high-performance parallelized wait-free consensus protocol in which every client will
eventually see its requests executed, the load of non-faulty replicas is evenly distributed, and the
impact of faulty replicas is minimized. Additionally, the parallelization paradigm we propose
can also turn partial consensus protocols into high-performance parallelized wait-free consensus
protocols.
Proof. We consider the following instances of the parallelization paradigm based on how one
deals with primary failure and clients:
1. failed primaries are not replaced and clients can request instance reassignment; and
2. primaries are replaced and clients are assigned statically to instances.
In both cases, non-divergence of the parallelized protocol follows from non-divergence of the
underlying consensus protocol, which assures that all replicas reach the same consensus decision
for each instance in each round, and the deterministic round execution of the execution protocol
(Proposition 3.4). Next, we look at termination, which follows directly from termination of the
underlying consensus protocol.
The equal distribution of load among all replicas follows from the uniform assignment of
clients to each instance (when primaries are replaced) and by the upper-bound on the assigned
clients when client can request instance reassignment. The impact of faulty replicas is minimized
due to the resulting protocol being wait-free (Theorem 4.4).
5 Related work
There is an abundant literature on consensus protocols and, in specific, primary-backup consen-
sus protocols (e.g., [6, 9, 17, 22, 33, 39, 40]). In this paper, we primarily focus on works that
address the limitations of primary-backup protocols, as described in the Introduction. Several
different approaches towards resolving some of these limitations have been considered in the
literature.
Leader-free protocols. Several leader-free protocols have been proposed to eliminate any
issues arising from the discrepancy in responsibilities between primaries and backups, especially
with respect to malicious primary behavior [8, 30]. In these leader-free designs, all replicas have
the same responsibilities, the same load, and have the same impact on the system performance.
Unfortunately, these leader-free designs come at high communication costs, making their practi-
cal usage limited. Recently, HoneyBadgerBFT proposed a leader-free design based on expensive
asynchronous broadcast protocols and reduce the amortized per-request communication cost by
making the batch size a function of the communication complexity of the protocol. We believe
that simpler and more efficient primary-backup designs are more suitable for high-performance
applications, and we view fine-tuning their performance (e.g., via parallelization as explored in
this paper, or by applying amortized optimizations such as explored in HoneyBadgerBFT) as a
more promising avenue for further development.
The Proof-of-Work (PoW) protocol and other similar protocols employed by cryptocurren-
cies [17, 22, 31, 43] are also leader-less. These protocols can be employed in permissionless
environments in which participants can join and leave at any time [35]. Unfortunately, for many
practical applications the computational costs of PoW are too high and the throughput too
low [16, 34, 42]. As permissioned bft-style protocols outperform PoW by several orders of
magnitudes, this rules out their usage in the permissioned setting we study in this paper.
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Redistribution of tasks. Recently, several complex consensus protocols have been proposed
that use cryptographic techniques to reduce the communication costs of bft-style consen-
sus [20, 44], which especially adds burden on the primary. In LinBFT, this is partially addressed
by deferring some of the primary tasks to other replicas. Unfortunately, this complicates the
design significantly, as the protocol not only has to detect and replace faulty primaries, but also
detect and compensate for deferred faulty replicas. Moreover such deferral techniques are highly
protocol-specific and only address issues related to the primary load, not to the costs of primary
replacement or other malicious behavior by the primary. Other designs, such as FastBFT [28],
uses tree-based overlay networks and efficient message aggregation to reduce the total commu-
nication cost of the protocol. The usage of overlay networks is orthogonal to our approach and
can reduce communication of the consensus protocol on which our paradigm relies.
Reducing malicious behavior. Several works have observed that traditional bft-style con-
sensus protocols only address a narrow set of malicious behavior, namely behavior that prevents
any progress [2, 5, 14, 41]. Hence, several designs have been proposed to also address behavior
that impedes performance without completely preventing progress. One such design is Rbft,
which uses parallelization not to improve performance—as we propose—but only to detect ma-
licious behavior. In practice, the design of Rbft results in poor performance at high costs.
Another design is Spinning [41], which proposes to replace the primary every round. This would
not incur the costs of Rbft, while still reducing the impact of faulty replicas to severely reduce
throughput. In our parallelization paradigm, however, we provide wait-free consensus to in-
stances with non-faulty primaries, which allows those instances to always process client requests
at maximum throughput.
6 Conclusions and future work
In this paper, we propose a novel paradigm for parallelizing consensus protocols in a wait-free
manner, thereby improving the system throughput by reducing the load on individual replicas
and sharply reducing the impact of faulty replicas. Our techniques are protocol-agnostic, ad-
justable to several settings, and can be combined with many readily available primary-backup
consensus protocols. Hence, our paradigm opens the door for the development of new and highly
performant permissioned blockchain applications.
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